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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from the final judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Wasatch County, entered by the Honorable Donald J. Eyre. Jurisdiction is conferred on
this Court by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (2)(j) (2003) (appeals transferred to the Court
of Appeals from the Supreme Court).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err by determining that Middle Fork Road is a public road

dedicated and abandoned to the public in accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5104(1)? Specifically did the court err by determining use of Middle Fork Road was
continuous in spite of constant posting of "No Trespassing" signs, and that Middle Fork
Road was a public thoroughfare when the few witnesses for the Plaintiff may have either
been using the road by private right or had self-serving special interests in the road?
ISSUE PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT: Issue one was preserved in the trial court,
(R.481:90-94,95-97).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court should review the application of UTAH CODE
ANN.

§ 72-5-104(1) (2003) and its predecessor, UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-89 (1998), for

correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994). However, the Court may give
the trial court a fair degree of latitude in determining the legal consequences under such
statutes. Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 143-44,417 P.2d 646, 648-49 (Utah 1966).

1

2.

Did the trial court err by reaching its decision without evidence sufficient to

maintain a clear and convincing burden of proof?
ISSUE PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT: Issue two was preserved in the trial court
(R.481:95,103).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court should review the trial court's findings of fact
under a clearly erroneous standard. Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999). The
appellant must show that material findings are clearly erroneous by marshaling all
evidence supporting the findings, then showing this evidence is legally insufficient to
support the findings when viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings.
Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES. ORDINANCES, RULES OR REGULATIONS
UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-104(1) (2003) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has
been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years.
Id.
§ 27-12-89 (1998), which was effective until 1998 when it was
repealed and renumbered as § 72-5-104(1), provided as follows:

UTAH CODE ANN.

A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of
the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period
of ten years.
Id.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This case deals with the application of UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-104(1), and its
predecessor, UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-89 to land owned by the Defendants. This case
arises from a dispute between the Plaintiff and Defendants concerning rights to an
unimproved mountain road ("Middle Fork Road") that crosses the Defendants' land and
leads onto land owned by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought this litigation seeking a
determination that the road be declared dedicated and abandoned to the public.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This action commenced on November 21, 2000 when AWINC Corp., an
Oklahoma Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "AWINC"), initiated litigation against
Randy T. Simonsen (hereinafter referred to as "Simonsen"), in the Fourth Judicial District
Court, in and for Wasatch County, State of Utah, Civil No. 000500472, entitled AWINC
Corp., an Oklahoma Corporation, Plaintiff vs. Randy T. Simonsen, Defendant. (R.8).
The complaint claimed a prescriptive easement, including demands for trespass damages
for the erection of a gate across a trail and requesting a permanent injunction requiring the
opening of the gate. (R.2-3).
On September 5, 2001, an amended complaint was filed adding as Defendants
Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership and Simlew, L.C., also known as
Simlew, L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company (hereinafter also collectively referred to
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as "Simonsen"). (R.51). The amended complaint added a cause of action requesting
declaratory judgment that the trail which was the subject of the initial complaint be
determined to be a public road. (R.44).
On January 27, 28, and 29, 2003, the matter was tried before the Honorable
Donald J. Eyre. (R.404-07).
At the close of AWINC's presentation of evidence, pursuant to motion by
Simonsen, AWINC's claims for a private prescriptive easement, damages pursuant to
trespass and an injunction removing the gate on the subject trail, pursuant to a private,
prescriptive easement were dismissed. (R.480:60).
C. DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
At the conclusion of the trial, the court determined that, pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. § 72-5-104(1) (2003), and its predecessor, UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-89 (1998),
Middle Fork Road was a public road and directed Simonsen to remove the lock from the
gate blocking the road. (R.481:110). Judgment was entered on March 10, 2003. (R.452).
The notice of appeal was filed by Simonsen on April 7, 2003. (R.454).
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In 1995, Defendants, Simonsen, acquired land ("Defendant Property") a

portion of which is located near Soldier Summit in the North Vi of Section 13, Township
10 South, Range 7 East, and North lA of Section 18, Township 10 South, Range 8 East,
Salt Lake Base & Meridian. (R.448).
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2.

Defendants bought their property in 1995 from William Irving. (R.481:26-

27). William Irving acquired the land by quitclaim deed in 1988 from Utah Shell
Products; Utah Shell acquired the property in the early 1920's. (R.480:62,64).
3.

In 1997, Plaintiff, AWINC, received a deed to property and patented mining

claims in Wasatch County, Utah ("Plaintiff Property"). (R.448). Part of Plaintiff Property
is located near Defendant Property, northeasterly of what is commonly known as Soldier
Summit, Utah and which is in the Southeast 1/4 of Section 18, part of Section 17, and part
of the South XA of Section 8 in Township 10 south, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base &
Meridian. (R.448).
4.

Michael Pettis is the president of AWINC Corp. (R.479:97).

5.

Plaintiff Property is separated from Defendant Property by a narrow strip of

land owned by the U.S. Forest Service. (R.448).
6.

A road known as Left Fork Road ("Left Fork Road") extends across part of

Defendant Property running from the south boundary northwesterly to and across the west
boundary line of the property. (R.447-48).
7.

Middle Fork Road, the subject of this litigation, traverses the Defendant

Property, Forest Service property and Plaintiff Property. (R.447). Middle Fork Road is
accessed at its far south end by Left Fork Road and at its north end by a U.S. Forest
Service trail sometimes called Crossover Road. (R.447). Middle Fork Road is more
particularly described as follows:
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That currently existing unimproved mountain road, 10 feet in width,
commencing at the intersection of the Left Fork Road and what is
sometimes known as Middle Fork Road, in Wasatch County, Utah, and
which intersection is in either the Northeast 1/4 of Section 13, Township 10
South, Range 7 East, or the Northwest 1/4 of Section 18, Township 10
South, Range 8 East, SLB&M, and running northeasterly, then
southeasterly, then southerly, then again southeasterly, and then again
northeasterly across portions of Section 13, Township 10 South, Range 7
East and Sections 18, 17 and 8 of Township 10 South, Range 8 East,
SLB&M, to the northerly boundary of the Plaintiff Property. (R.447).
8.

Four individuals, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Addis, and Mr. Earl, testified

for the Plaintiff that they had used the entire length of Middle Fork Road at various,
numerous, and separate times each year beginning more than ten years prior to the
erection of the gate across the Middle Fork Road. (R.445). Each witness used Middle
Fork Road during the spring, summer and fall months of the year. (R.445). None of
these four witnesses owned property in the area and each testified that they did not ask for
permission to use the road. (R.445). These four witnesses saw others using the road over
the years that were not part of their group. (R.445).
9.

Cullen Goodwin testified as follows:
A.

Mr. Goodwin stated that he had been using Middle Fork Road from
1965 up until the erection of the gate, making eight to ten trips to the
area each year totaling close to 45 days a year. (R.479:9-l 1).

B.

Mr. Goodwin used that road to access nearby land for fishing,
sightseeing, hunting and camping. Mr. Goodwin put a lot of work
into the property accessed by Middle Fork Road. He constructed
6

dams to attract elk to the area, and built hunting blinds.
(R.479:11,57).
C.

Mr. Goodwin testified that no one ever told him that he could not use
Middle Fork Road, that no one ever told him that the road was a
private road, and that he believed that the road was public because
there were never any signs designating that it was private.
(R.479:32-33).

D.

To continue his activities in the area, Mr. Goodwin stated that 10 to
12 years ago he sought and gained permission from Boyd Marson,
who purportedly owned property in that area. (R.479:60-62).

David Ellis testified as follows:
A.

Mr. Ellis stated that he started using the road to access property in
the area in 1977 or 1978. Mr. Ellis stated that Mr. Goodwin
introduced him to the property and took him up to the property to
hunt. He further stated that he used the road to access property in the
area on average five to eight times a year. (R.479:207, 210-11).

B.

Mr. Ellis used the property for camping, fishing, hiking, and hunting.
(R.479:206-07).

C.

Mr. Ellis testified that he did not ask for permission to use Middle
Fork Road, that he was never denied access to the road, and that he
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did not believe that he needed to ask permission to use the road
because he thought it was public. (R.479:219-20). Mr. Ellis stated
that he saw other people not of his group using Middle Fork Road
and that he did not know if they had permission to use the road or if
they were property owners. (R.479:221-23).
D.

Early on, Mr. Ellis believed that the land he was using was Forest
Service or BLM property. When he learned that the land was
privately owned, he, along with Mr. Goodwin, sought permission to
use the land from Mr. Marson. (R.479:223-24). Mr. Ellis, along with
Mr. Goodwin also later obtained permission to use the land from Mr.
Pettis. (R.479:56,223).

11.

Fred Addis testified as follows:
A.

Mr. Addis began using the property sometime in the 1960's. He used
the road to access land in the area around 15 or 20 times a year.
(R.480:7,9).

B.

Mr. Addis used property accessed by Middle Fork Road for animal
spotting, camping, and for hunting. (R.480:7).

C.

Up until recently, when Mr. Addis got permission to hunt from Mr.
Pettis, Mr. Addis never had anyone tell him that he needed
permission to use Middle Fork Road and no one ever told him to get
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off Middle Fork Road. (R.480:20).
12.

Kenneth Earl testified as follows:
Mr. Earl began using the road in the late 1940?s to early 1950fs. In

A.

the last twenty years he has used the road three or four times a year.
(R.480:39-40).
B.

Mr. Earl uses the land accessed by Middle Fork Road to relax, hunt,
camp, and to fish. Mr. Earl emphased that the area has some of the
best fishing in the country for his grandchildren. (R.480:40,56).

C.

Mr. Earl has never owned or leased any property in the area and he
testified that he has not asked anyone for permission to use the road.
(R.480:39,51).

13.

In the 1960's up to the time of the erection of the gate across Middle Fork

Road, the Lessee's of the Defendant Property and the previous owners of the Defendant
Property had placed rocks and tires with the words "No Trespass" painted on them in the
general area where Middle Fork Road accessed Left Fork Road and directly upon Middle
Fork Road. (R.446).
14.

Orrin Jackson, a member of the Jackson family who leased the property

containing Middle Fork Road and whose deposition was read into evidence, stated as
follows:
A.

That during the time the Jackson's owned the lease on the land they
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repeatedly attempted to prevent the public from using the trail, now
called Middle Fork Road. (R.480:96-98).
15.

Joseph Jackson, the brother of Orrin Jackson and whose deposition was also
read into evidence, stated as follows:
A.

Joseph Jackson stated that he also attempted to prevent use of the
trial now called Middle Fork Road. Mr. Jackson stated they would
put a camp in the area, pull logs across the road, and place signs in
an attempt to keep people out. (R.480:l 10). These attempts were
made in the same location that the Defendants placed The Gate
across Middle Fork Road. (R.480:118).

B.

Joseph Jackson indicated that even when he turned the lease over to
George Jackson in 1968 or 1969 he continued to make efforts to
keep the public out. (R.480:107,111).

C.

Joseph Jackson stated that the lease was turned over to Boyd Marson
in the early 1970fs, that he used it for around five years, and then
turned it over to Vern Wilson. (R. 480:107-108).

16.

William Irving, who obtained the property including Middle Fork Road in

1988, testified as follows:
A.

Mr. Irving testified that when he bought the land Mr. Wilson was
still leasing the property. (R.480:66-68). Mr. Irving instructed Mr.
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Wilson to keep people out and to police the area as his
representative. He also asked the Forest Service to mark their
property boundary. (R.480:69-70,73)
B.

Mr. Irving also told a group collecting fossils in 1991 that they were
trespassing and directed a museum in Price to stop giving the public
directions to his property. (R.480:84,88-89).

17.

David Cunningham, a real estate broker that facilitated the sell of the

property from Mr. Irving to Mr. Simonsen, testified as follows:
A.

Mr. Cunningham contacted Mr. Irving in 1993 and learned that Mr.
Irving was interested in selling his property. Inspecting the property
in 1993 Mr. Cunningham noticed "No Trespassing" signs at the
bottom or Middle Fork Road as well as a tire with the words "No
Trespassing" painted on it. (R.481:26-27,29).

B.

Mr. Cunningham first visited the area in 1987 and stated that at that
time he noticed that there were "No Trespassing" signs posted at the
junction of Left Fork Road and Middle Fork Road. Mr. Cunningham
stated that the signs prevented him from continuing up the road. He
returned to the area in 1988 and noticed the same signs. (R.481:2932).

18.

Donald Blanchard, Defendant Simonsen's brother-in-law, testified as
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follows:
A.

Mr. Blanchard testified that he first came through the area between
1988 and the early 1990's, and that he noticed "No Trespassing"
signs paintings on rocks, and tires where Left Fork Road crosses
Defendant's property. (R.481:48-49).

B.

Mr. Blanchard accompanied Mr. Simonsen to the property in 1995
and noticed the same markings on the rocks and tires. Mr. Blanchard
replaced some of the tires with permanent signs after Defendants
bought the property. (R.481:50-51).

19.

Jeffrey Simonsen, a nephew to Defendant Simonsen, testified that while

hunting in 1995, Mr. Wilson attempted to keep him off of Middle Fork Road. (R.48L44).
20.

Randy T. Simonsen testified that he terminated the lease with Mr. Wilson

when he bought the property because Mr. Wilson was authorizing hunters to go on the
property. (R.480:180-81).
21.

In 1996 or 1997, Defendants erected and placed a gate across Middle Fork

Road near the road's intersection with Left Fork Road ("The Gate"). (R.447). Since that
time until the decision in this case, Defendants have maintained The Gate and prohibited
access through The Gate except with permission of Defendants. (R.447).
22.

Defendants prohibited Plaintiff from accessing Middle Fork Road through

The Gate except upon condition that Plaintiff relinquish any right to ownership over that
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road. (R.446).
23.

In 1997, Defendants constructed a fence at a distance of approximately 200

feet on each side of The Gate. (R.446).
24.

In 1997, a fence wire drop gate was constructed by Mr. Blanchard, under

the direction of the Defendants, across Middle Fork Road where the road crosses the
easterly-most boundary of Defendant Property and enters Forest Service property.
(R.446).
25.

Beginning in 1995 and continuing to the time of trial, Defendants posted

their property with signs reading "No Trespass" and prohibited use of the portion of
Middle Fork Road that crossed Defendants property except by permission. (R.446).
26.

Beginning in 1997 and continuing to the time of trial, the Plaintiff posted

the Plaintiff property with signs declaring "No Trespass." Plaintiff testified that he did
not restrict use of Middle Fork Road but rather prohibited use of the surrounding property
without permission. (R.445).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court incorrectly interpreted the law by determining that Middle Fork

Road was dedicated and abandoned to the public pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5104(1). The court erred in declaring the use continuous despite the posting of "No
Trespassing" signs for many decades. Various witnesses were presented at trial by the
Defendants to establish that signs, rocks, tires, and logs had been used to keep the public
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off the road. Despite this evidence, the court held that these efforts were insufficient to
interrupt the continuous use of the roadway in question. Should this interpretation of the
statute be allowed to be the law in the State of Utah, Defendants can see no effective way
for a private land owner to interrupt the continuous use of his or her property by the
public, short of miles of fencing or personally guarding the road. Forcing this burden on
private landowners goes against public policy in Utah.
The court also erred in determining that the road was a public thoroughfare. Of
the four witnesses presented by the Plaintiff two gained permission to use areas accessed
by the road ten to twelve years ago and one in the last several years. Any period the road
was used by permission, or used to gain access to other areas by permission cannot be
used to prove dedication. There was only one witnesses presented by the Plaintiff that
had not gained permission to use the area. These witnesses are not sufficient to show use
by the general public. Beyond this, none of the witnesses presented by Plaintiff were
truly members of the general public because they all have self-serving or special interests
in the road.
II.

The trial court's determination, without sufficient evidence to maintain a

clear and convincing burden of proof, is clearly erroneous. The Plaintiff presented four
witnesses, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Addis, and Mr. Earl to establish that the road was
continuously used without interruption for ten years. These four testified they had been
using the road for decades without interruption. The Defendants, however, presented
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evidence demonstrating that as far back as the early 1960's, attempts were made to control
the public's use of the road. In particular, the lessee's of the property placed barriers and
"No trespassing" signs on rocks and tires along the road to limit access.
The Plaintiff presented the same four witnesses to establish that the road was used
by the public. These four witnesses stated they used the road frequently and observed
others using the road. However, the Defendants presented evidence to show that these
witnesses were not members of the general public. At some point, three of the four
witnesses received permission to use the land made accessible by the road. Further,
because the four witnesses have used the road for many years to further their personal
recreational interests, the witnesses cannot be considered members of the general public
but, rather, individuals with a special, self-serving interest in retaining access to the road.
When all the evidence is marshaled in favor of the verdict, there is insufficient evidence
to support the judgment by clear and convincing evidence.
ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in determining that the unimproved mountain road running
across Defendant Simonsen's property ("Middle Fork Road") should be abandoned to the
public. The trial court's application of UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-104(1) and its
predecessor, § 27-12-89 was an incorrect interpretation of the law in that the requirements
of the statute were not met in this case. As detailed below, the use of Middle Fork Road
was not continuous nor was the road used as a public thoroughfare as required by law.
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The trial court also made its determination without sufficient evidence to establish the
clear and convincing burden of proof required.

I.

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE
LAW BY RULING THAT MIDDLE FORK ROAD WAS
DEDICATED AND ABANDONED TO THE PUBLIC PURSUANT
TO UTAH CODE § 72-5-104(1) BECAUSE USE WAS NOT
CONTINUOUS NOR WAS THE ROAD A PUBLIC
THOROUGHFARE

The trial court's application of UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-104(1) to this case was
not correct because use of the road was not continuous for the required period nor was it
used as a public thoroughfare. As discussed below, the trial court erred in determining
that use of Middle Fork Road was continuous even though "No Trespassing" signs have
been constantly posted, and erred in deciding that the road was a public thoroughfare used
freely and without limit by the general public.
A.

The trial court erred in determining that the use of Middle Fork Road
was continuous for ten years in spite of constant posting of "No
Trespassing" signs.

The continuous placement of "No Trespassing" signs on Defendants's property
and on Middle Fork Road show that use of the road cannot be continuous as required by
statute. Since use was not continuous on the road the trial court was not correct in
determining that the road was abandoned to the public.
Utah code requires, in order to declare a highway dedicated and abandoned to the
public, it be established that the highway "has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period often years." UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-104(1). The element
16

that the road must be continuously used is of central importance in determining whether
the road should be dedicated and abandoned to the public.
This Court stated that "there had been continuous and uninterrupted use of a road .
.. where 'the public, even though not consisting of a great many persons, made a
continuous and uninterrupted use . . . as often as they found it convenient or necessary.'"
Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah App. 1998), (citing Boyer v.
Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107 (Utah 1958)). In that case, landowners and the
county disagreed as to whether a certain road had been dedicated to the public. Id. at
807. It was determined that the road was not a public thoroughfare because the
landowners generally locked a gate that crossed the road, and several witnesses testified
that they were prevented from accessing the road by the locked gate. Id.
Several cases, while not directly determining the effect on use, have addressed the
placing of "No Trespassing" signs as a method of interrupting continuous use. The Utah
Supreme Court stated in a recent case evolving the dedication of a road that summary
judgment was not proper because, inter alia, there were disputed facts as to the
continuous use for the required ten years. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d
1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). In that case, Draper City and some individuals commenced an
action to have a road known as Lower Comer Canyon Road declared dedicated and
abandoned to the public. Id. 1098. The trial court granted summary judgment and the
Utah Supreme Court reversed on appeal. Id. at 1098, 1101. The court stated that some of
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the facts that disputed the claim that public use had been continuous for ten years were
that"

owners posted 'no trespassing' signs at the entrance to the road . . . they

blocked the road through means which varied from digging trenches to stacking concrete
blocks and to piling dirt, rock, and snow to prevent trespassing." Id. 1100.
This Court has indicated that one reason a road could be considered dedicated to
the public would be that the landowners " . . . . did not fence off the roadway, did not
post any signs, and in general made no attempts to limit the passage of the public."
Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 913 (Utah App. 1996). In that case, the dispute
revolved around a driveway that provided access to several pieces of property. Id. at
910. This Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the roadway was dedicated to the
public because the landowners made no attempts, such as fencing or posting signs, to
limit the passage of the public. Id. at 913,14. This reasoning would indicate that if the
landowners had taken the designated steps, the determination that the road was dedicated
to the public may have been different.
In this case, there has been constant posting of "No Trespassing" from the 1960's
up to the present time. In 1924 the land surrounding Middle Fork Road was transferred
to Utah Shell Products (hereinafter "Shell"). (R.480:62-63). The property was owned by
Shell until 1988 when a quitclaim deed was issued to William Irving. (R.480:64).
Defendant Simonsen purchased the property in 1995 from Mr. Irving. (R.480:165).
The Plaintiff presented four witnesses, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Addis, and
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Mr. Earl, who testified that they used Middle Fork Road with their families from the mid
1960's or 1970fs until the time the Defendants erected The Gate. (R.445). The witnesses
testified that they did not ask permission to use the road, did not notice any signs and
believed the road was public. (R.479:33,220;R480:22,51).
The Defendants produced evidence at trial that there were in fact "No
Trespassing" signs placed along Middle Fork Road since the mid 1960's. The Jackson
Family leased the property, including what is now Middle Fork Road, from Shell for
sheep grazing purposes in the 1920fs. (R.480:93). The lease remained in the Jackson
family for many years. Orrin Jackson stated that during the time the Jackson's owned the
lease on the land they made repeated efforts to prevent the public from using the trail that
is now called Middle Fork Road. (R.480:96-98). Joseph Jackson, Orrin Jackson's
brother, stated that starting sometime in the early 1960fs he made attempts to prevent use
of the trail now refferred to as Middle Fork Road. (R.480:l 10). Joseph Jackson stated
that they erected their camp up in the area, they pulled logs across the road, and placed
"No Trespassing" signs in and effort to keep people out and to block the road.
(R.480:l 10). Joseph Jackson stated that the area where he put up signs and placed logs
across the road is about the exact location were the Defendants placed The Gate in 1996
or 1997 across Middle Fork Road at the junction from Left Fork Road. (R.480:l 18).
Joseph Jackson stated that even when they turned the lease over to his cousin
George Jackson, in 1968 or 1969, they continued their efforts to prevent the public from
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using what is now Middle Fork Road. (R.480:107,111). Joseph Jackson stated that "[w]e
made an effort as much as we could" to stop use of the road. (R.480: 111).
The Jackson lease was turned over or sold to Boyd Marson in the early 1970fs.
(R.480:107). Joseph Jackson stated that Mr. Marson used the lease for five or six years
and then turned it over to Vern Wilson. (R.480:108).
When Mr. Irving purchased the property, including Middle Fork Road, in 1988 by
quitclaim deed from Shell, Mr. Wilson was still leasing the property. (R.480:66-68). Mr.
Irving testified that he instructed Mr. Wilson to keep people out. (R.480:69-70). Mr.
Jeffrey Simonsen testified that when he was hunting in 1995, Mr. Wilson attempted to
keep him off of the property; he was parked on Middle Fork Road at the time.
(R.481:44). Mr. Irving stated that his efforts to keep people off the road included asking
the Forest Service to mark their property boundary and to have Mr. Wilson act as his
personal representative in policing the area and asking people to leave. (R.480:69,73).
Mr. Irving stated that in 1991 he found some people collecting fossils in the area
where the Middle Fork Road crossed his property and told them they were trespassing.
(R.480:84,88). Mr. Irving discovered that a museum in Price was giving out directions
for collecting fossils on his property. (R.480:88-89). Mr. Irving objected to the museum
giving directions to his property and museum personell assured him they would no longer
advise that fossils were there for public use. (R.480:88-89).
In 1993, Mr. Irving was contacted by David Cunningham, a real estate broker
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specializing in selling mountain property. (R.481:26-27). Mr. Irving told Mr.
Cunningham that he would be interested in selling his property. (R.481:27). In the
summer of 1993 Mr. Cunningham inspected the property including Middle Fork Road.
(R.481:27). Mr. Cunningham stated that during his visit he noticed "No Trespassing"
signs at the bottom of Middle Fork Road where the stream crosses the road. (R.481:29).
Mr. Cunningham also testified that there were large rocks on the side of the hill above
Middle Fork Road as well as a tire all with the words "No Trespassing" painted on them.
(R.481:29).
Mr. Cunningham further testified that he first visited the area in 1987. (R.481:2930). He stated that he was in the area to do some hunting and noticed that there were "No
Trespassing" signs posted at the junction of Left Fork and Middle Fork Road. (R.481:31).
Mr. Cunningham testified that the signs stopped him from crossing over the stream and
continuing up Middle Fork Road. (R.481:31). He further testified that he returned to the
area in 1988 and again noticed the "No Trespassing" signs. (R.481:32).
Donald Blanchard, defendant Simonsen's brother-in-law, testified that he had
come through the area sometime between 1988 the early 1990's. (R.481:48). Mr.
Blanchard testified that he noticed "No Trespassing" signs, paintings on rocks, and tires
in the area where the Left Fork Road crosses Defendants's property. (R.481:48-49). Mr.
Blanchard testified that in 1995, prior to Defendants buying the property, he accompanied
Simonsen to look at the property surrounding Middle Fork Road and that there were still
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"Keep Out" or "No Trespassing" markings on rocks and tires. (R.481:50-51). Mr.
Blanchard testified that after Simonsen bought the property he (Blanchard) removed some
of the tires and replaced them with permanent signs. (R.481:50-51).
Mr. Irving sold the property to defendant Randy Simonsen in 1995, and in 1996 or
1997 Simonsen placed The Gate across Middle Fork Road. (R.480:165,176-77).
Continuously since that time and until the time of trial, Defendants maintained The Gate
in a closed and locked condition and prohibited use or access to Middle Fork Road.
(R.447).
This Court in Campbell held that the public must have made continuous and
uninterrupted use of the road whenever they found it necessary or convenient. Although
"the public" does not need to be numerous individuals, it must be shown that the public
used the road whenever they wanted to.
Although not ruling directly on the issue, the court in Draper, stated that factors
that can be used to dispute a claim of continuous use include the posting of no trespassing
signs and using other methods to block or restrict access to the road. This Court, in
Kohler, indicated that the road would be considered dedicated to the public because the
landowners did not fence off or use signs and did not attempt to restrict passage on the
road.
In this case, there is evidence that since the 1960's the lessees of the land now
owned by the Defendants placed no trespassing signs, barriers, and attempted to limit

22

passage on the road. Evidence of these attempts to restrict the public were presented at
trial as outlined above and the judge found these facts to be true as stated in the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R.446). The judge found that "[commencing
sometime in the . . . 1960fs and continuing to the time of.. . 1995 . . . the Defendant
Property or portions thereof were leased for sheep grazing purposes. One or more of
those lessees had placed along Left Fork Road rocks and tires on which had been painted
words declaring 'No Trespass.' Such were also placed in the general area where Middle
Fork Road accessed Left Fork Road and upon Middle Fork Road . . .." (R.446).
Although it is impossible to show exactly how effective these measures were, these
actions by the landowners over many years certainly deterred members of the public from
using the road as evidenced by the trial testimony of Mr. Irving, Mr. Cunningham and Mr.
Blanchard. (R.480:84,88;R.481:31,48-49).
In the Middle Fork Road area it would be practically impossible to completely
prevent people from trespassing on the road. The owners and lessees of the land made
significant attempts to prevent the public from using the road. Perhaps in a more
accessable or residential area greater measures would be required to restrict access. In the
desolate area were Middle Fork Road is located the placement of signs is the most logical
method of restricting access. If "No Trespassing" signs are not enough to prevent a road
from becoming public, then a private landowner in a similar situation is placed in the
difficult position of either putting up miles and miles of fencing or personally standing
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guard over the property. Public policy in Utah should not support this heavy burden on a
private landowner.
Similar to the facts in Draper, where there were "No Trespassing" signs and other
attempts to prevent public access, there were attempts in this case to keep the public out
and off the road. This case is opposite to the situation in Kohler, were the road was
considered dedicated because no attempts were made to keep the public out. Both
Draper and Kohler mention the use of "No Trespassing" signs. In this situation, on this
type of land, the use of signs should be enough to interrupt the continuous use of the road.
The placement of signs shows that outside use was not continuous because
members of the public were not allowed to use the road whenever they found it
"necessary or convenient" as required in Campbell Despite the trial court's
determination that the landowners' attempt to restrict travel had no effect, a significant
effort was made to stop travel across Middle Fork Road. This effort was enough, in this
situation, to interrupt the continuous use that is required by Utah statute. Since public use
was interrupted by these measures the determination by the trial court that Middle Fork
Road was dedicated and abandoned to the public is an incorrect interpretation of the
statute.
B.

The trial court erred in determining that Middle Fork Road was a
public thoroughfare when the witnesses presented by Plaintiff were
either individuals who may have been using the area by private right
or with self-serving or special interests in the road.

Utah law requires that to become public the road be used continuously as a "public
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thoroughfare." UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-104(1). The requirement that the road be used
as a public thoroughfare was not established in this case. Of the several witnesses
presented by the Plaintiff, AWINC, to show the land was used by the public, only one
used the land entirely without permission. All of the witnesses presented by the Plaintiff
had special interests in the road and provided self-serving testimony. The court's
decision that this use transformed Middle Fork Road into a public thoroughfare is an
incorrect application of the statute.
As stated above, Utah code requires, in order to declare a highway dedicated and
abandoned to the public, that it be established that the highway "has been continuously
used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years." UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5104(1). The "public thoroughfare" element has been thoroughly examined and defined
by Utah case law.
The Utah Supreme Court held that "[a] 'thoroughfare' is a place or way through
which there is passing or travel. It becomes a 'public thoroughfare' when the public
have a general right of passage." Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 311 (Utah
1997). The court further stated that". . . the highway . .. will be deemed dedicated or
abandoned to the public use when the public has continuously used it as a thoroughfare
for a period of 10 years, but such use must be by the public. Use under private right is
not sufficient." Id. In that case, the dispute arose over whether a road referred to as the
Airport Road was a public highway. Id. 308. The court held that the road met the
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requirements to be determined a public highway under statute. Id. at 312-13.
To establish the public thoroughfare element of the statute, the Plaintiff must show
that those using the land did so without permission. This Court has held that "[i]t is
firmly established under Utah law that permissive use cannot result in either adverse
possession or dedication of private property to the public." Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809.
The Court further states that a great number of individuals are not needed to prove public
use. Id. at 809.
The fact the road was used by the general public must be shown by witness
testimony that is not self-serving or simply reflecting one's own special interests. The
Utah Supreme Court in interpreting the predecessor to the current statute, stated that one
of the central questions in determining public use is "[w]as there sufficient evidence by
competent testimony, by witnesses who were not self-serving, to show by clear and
convincing evidence, that the public generally, not just a few having their own special and
private interests in the road, had used the road continuously for 10 years?" Petersen v.
Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545, 546-47 (Utah 1968). In that case, the dispute
revolved around the use of a mountain road in which one of the parties was attempting to
use to access their construction project. Id. In the Petersen case, the court stated the
witnesses introduced by the Plaintiff were self serving because they were either adjoining
property owners or were entitled to use the road. Id. The court held that adjacent
landowners or their guests cannot be considered members of the general public. Id.
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In this case, the Plaintiff introduced testimony from four individuals who had used
the road over the years in an attempt to show that the road had been used by the public.
Two of these witnesses, Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Ellis, had at one point, ten to twelve years
ago, gained permission to use either Middle Fork Road or an area nearby. (R.479:60-61).
Mr. Addis, more recently asked permission from Mr. Pettis. (R.480:20). As the Utah
Supreme Court stated in the Heber City case and this Court stated in Campbell,
permissive use can never result in dedication of private property to the public. Although
Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Ellis did use the road without permission for a period, at some
point the two witnesses received permission to use the area.
The first witness called by the Plaintiff was Cullen Goodwin. Mr. Goodwin stated
that he had been using the road starting in 1965 up until 2002. (R.479:9). Mr. Goodwin
stated that he made 8 to 10 trips to the area a year, totaling around 45 days a year that he
would use the road. (R.479:11). Mr. Goodwin stated that he did not ask permission to
use Middle Fork Road, that he did not see any signs, and that he thought the road was
public. (R.479:32-33). However, Mr. Goodwin stated that he sought and gained
permission to use the land accessed by the road around ten or twelve years ago from Boyd
Marson who owned property in the area at the time. (R.479:60-61). Regardless of
exactly what permission was given, permissive use of the road or of an adjacent piece of
land accessed by the road cannot be considered public use for purposes of dedicating the
road as held in Campbell and Heber City.
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The next witness for the Plaintiff was David Ellis. Mr. Ellis started using the
property in 1977 or 1978. (R.479:207). Mr. Ellis stated that it was Mr. Goodwin that
introduced him to the property and accompanied him to the property to hunt.
(R.479:207). Mr. Ellis testified that he used the road for five to eight trips to the area per
year. (R.479:210-l 1). At first Mr. Ellis believed that the land was owned by the forest
service or BLM; when he learned the property was privately owned he sought permission
from Mr. Marson. (R.479:224). In approximately 1999 both Mr. Ellis and Mr. Goodwin
gained permission to use the AWINC property from Mr. Pettis. (R.479:56). Mr. Ellis
stated that he did not ask permission to use Middle Fork Road. (R.479:219-20).
The third witness called by the Plaintiff to show that the road was used by the
general public was Fred Addis. Mr. Addis stated that he began using the property
sometime in the 1960fs. (R.480:7). Mr. Addis stated that he used Middle Fork Road to
access land in the area approximately 15 or 20 times a year, and that he did not ask
permission to use Middle Fork Road until he asked permission from Mr. Pettis in 2001 or
2002. (R.480:9,20).
The last witness called to show public use was Kenneth Earl. Mr. Earl stated that
he used Middle Fork Road as far back as the late 1940fs and early 1950's. (R.480:39). In
the last twenty years Mr. Earl stated that he has used the road three or four times a year,
has never owned property in the area, and has never asked permission to use Middle Fork
Road. (R.480:39-40,51).
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All of these witnesses had also observed others using the road over the years.
(R.445). However when questioned whether they knew if these people were using the
land by permission each stated that he did not know. (R.479:76-77,219-20;R.480:34,52).
None of these other people observed by the witnesses using the road testified at trial.
There is no way to determine from the evidence presented at trial whether these other
people seen using the road were doing so with or without permission.
Of the four witnesses the Plaintiff called to show the road was used by the general
public, two gained permission to areas accessed by the road around ten to twelve years
ago. Mr. Addis also gained permission recently from Mr. Pettis to use the area. This
would indicate that they knew the road was not a public roadway. There was only one
witnesses, Mr. Earl, who did not obtain permission to use the road or surrounding area.
Although this court, in Campbell, stated that public use need not be proven by a "great
many persons" it was an incorrect application of the statute for the trial court to determine
that the witnesses presented by the Plaintiff, in this case, were sufficient to prove public
use.
In this case, none of the Plaintiffs witnesses were truly members of the general
public in the sense that they used the road without self-serving or special interests in the
area. All witnesses had used the area to camp, fish, and hunt for many years and some
had even built hunting camps in the area. As the court stated in Petersen, there must be
sufficient evidence by witnesses of the general public in order to establish a public way.
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Testimony of a few who have special or private interests in the road do not qualify as
members of the general public. Although in Petersen most of the witnesses were
adjoining landowners or their personal visitors, the court clearly stated that just a few
witnesses having their own special interests would not be enough to determine that a road
had been used by the general public. Even though the court in Peterson did not define
exactly what special interest would be required to exclude someone from testifying as a
member of the general public, the special interests of the witnesses in this case are
arguably sufficient.
The Plaintiff presented four witnesses to show that the road had been used by the
general public. All four of the witnesses had special interest in the case, and their
testimony was self serving.
Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Ellis stated that they used the road to gain access to land
used for hunting since the 1960's and 1970's. (R.479:9-l 1,207). They stated that they
built dams using the spring run-off to attract elk to the area for future hunting. (R.479:57).
Mr. Goodwin stated that he has done a lot of work on the land to keep animals on the
property accessed by Middle Fork Road. (R.479:57). Mr. Goodwin stated that he built
numerous hunting blinds on the property accessed by the road and that he has maintained
these blinds over the years. (R.479:11). Both Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Ellis have used
Middle Fork Road to access land for hunting, fishing, hiking and camping. (R.479:11,13).
Both Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Ellis have a special interest in ensuring that they are able to
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use the road in the future. Both Mr. Goodwin's and Mr. Ellis' testimony at trial served
their self interest in ensuring that the road remained open for their use.
Mr. Addis stated that he used the property accessed by Middle Fork Road as a
hunting and camping area as well as using the road for animal spotting. (R.480:6-7).
Mr. Addis has a special interest in seeing the road stay open for him to use. Mr. Addis'
testimony at trial was self-serving to his own special interest to keep the road open.
Mr. Earl stated he used the property accessed by Middle Fork Road over the years
to relax, camp, hunt and to fish. (R.480:40). Mr. Earl emphasized that the fishing,
accessed by using Middle Fork Road, is the best in the area for his grandchildren.
(R.480:56). Mr. Earl's testimony at trial is also self-serving to his own private interest of
continuing to access the land near Middle Fork Road.
As the court stated in Petersen, the testimony of a few people who have a special
or private interest in the road is not enough to prove use by the general public. All of the
Plaintiffs witnesses had their own special interest in the road, and their testimony was
self-serving. In addition three of the witnesses were using the road at some point by
permission. Permissive use can never be the basis for establishing a claim of
abandonment to the public. It was incorrect for the trial court to determine that the
general public had used the road with only these witnesses. The Plaintiff did not produce
members of the general public that used the road without any special interest or
permission. Thus, the court below did not correctly interpret the statute because it was
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not established that the road was used as a "public thoroughfare."
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DECIDING THE CASE
WITHOUT EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A
CLEAR AND CONVINCING BURDEN OF PROOF

The trial court decided this case with insufficient evidence to meet the clear and
convincing burden of proof required. The trial court's determination that Middle Fork
Road is abandoned and dedicated to the public based on the evidence presented at trial, is
clearly erroneous. When all the evidence in support of the judgment is inspected, the
evidence in this case is insufficient to support a judgment in favor of dedication of the
road to the public.
In order to establish that the evidence is not sufficient to establish the required
burden of proof, the evidence must be marshaled. This Court explained "[t]o support an
insufficiency of the evidence claim on appeal, 'the one challenging the verdict must
marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" Chapman v. Uintah
County, 81 P.3d 761, 769 (Utah App. 2003), (quoting Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433
(Utah 1998)). The Statement of Facts and the following information marshal all the
evidence that was presented to the trial court on this case.
In order to show that a road has been abandoned to the public, the Plaintiff must
show that the road had been (1) continuously used, (2) as a public thoroughfare, (3) for a
period often years. UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-104(1); see also Campbell, 962 P.2d at 808.
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These three factors must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Kohler, 916 P.2d
at 913. The Supreme Court of Utah has ruled that "[t]he law does not lightly allow the
transfer of property from private to public use." Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099. "The
presumption is in favor of the property owner; and the burden of establishing public use
for the required period of time is on those claiming it" Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine
Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981), (quoting Bonner, 417 P.2d at 648
(Utah 1966)).
In this case, the Plaintiff presented four witnesses, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Ellis, Mr.
Addis, and Mr. Earl to testify regarding the continuous use of the Middle Fork Road.
These four witnesses testified that they, along with family members, drove motor vehicles
along the entire length of the road. (R.445).
Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Addis, along with family members, used the entire length of
the road in 1965 and each year after up until The Gate was erected. (R.445) Both of
these witnesses used the road at various times during the year starting in the spring and
ending in October or November. (R.445).
Mr. Ellis, and members of his family, began using the road in the late 1970fs.
(R.445). They used the road, until the placement of The Gate, and drove motor vehicles
along the entire length of the road. (R.445). They used the road each year, on various
occasions, in the spring, summer, and fall for sightseeing and camping. (R.445).
Mr. Earl, with members of his family, began driving motor vehicles along the
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entire length of the road beginning in the 1970fs. (R.445). Mr. Earl used the road four or
five times each year until The Gate was placed. (R.445).
This evidence presented by the Plaintiff is insufficient to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the road was used continuously and uninterrupted for ten years.
Defendants presented evidence at trial to dispute the claim that the use of the road was
uninterrupted for the required time period.
Defendants presented evidence that since the 1960's up until the time Defendants
placed The Gate on Middle Fork Road lessees of the property placed rocks, tires, and logs
along the road with the words "no trespassing" painted on them. (R.446). These barriers
were placed in the same general area as The Gate that the Defendants placed across
Middle Fork Road in 1996. (R.480:l 18). The trial court held that these signs did not
prevent the public use of Middle Fork Road. (R.446). Witnesses presented by the
Defendants stated they attempted to keep people off of the road and control the property
throughout the years. (480:69-70,96-98). Several witnesses were presented by the
Defendants who stated that they noticed the barriers and that the signs and barriers
stopped them from using the road. (481:29-32,48-49). The placement of these barriers
and the attempts made by the owners or lessees of the owners to prevent use of the road is
enough to show that the Plaintiff did not meet its burden of showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the use of the road was continuous and uninterrupted for ten
years.
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The Plaintiff presented the same four witnesses to prove that the road was used by
the public. Each witness testified that he used the road without permission, and that he
did not own property in the area. Based upon this evidence, the trial court held that these
witnesses were members of the general public using the road without being given
permission. (R.445). The trial court ruled that these witnesses did not own property in the
area and that they would commonly encounter other people also using the road. (R.445).
The court ruled that the four witnesses were never told they could not use the road.
(R.445).
The evidence presented by the Plaintiff to show that the road was used by the
general public is insufficient to meet the burden required by clear and convincing
evidence. Three of the four witnesses received permission at some point to use the road
or an area accessed by the road. (R.479:60-62,223-24;R.480:20). It is well established
that any time period when these three witnesses had permission to use property accessed
by the road cannot be used to show dedication to the public. Asking for permission
shows they knew the area was private. There was only one witnesses presented by the
Plaintiff that did not ever have permission to use the area. The testimony of these
witnesses is not sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that the road was
used by the general public.
The witnesses stated that they saw others using the road. (R.445). It is impossible
to prove whether the other people using the road were also there by permission.
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Testimony at trial indicated that at least one of the lessees of the land traversed by Middle
Fork Road gave permission to others to use the road and surrounding area. In 1996 Mr.
Simonsen terminated Mr. Wilson's long time leasing rights because Mr. Wilson was
authorizing hunters to enter the property. (R.480:180-81).
All four of the witnesses presented by the Plaintiff to show use by the general
public had self-serving, special interests in the land accessed by Middle Fork Road. All
four witnesses had been using the road to access their hunting and camping locations.
(R.445). Several of the witnesses invested a great deal of time in the area constructing
and maintaining hunting blinds and dams. (R.479:l 1,57). None of the witnesses
presented by the Plaintiff were using the land as members of the general public without
special, self-serving interests in the road remaining open.
When the evidence presented by the Plaintiff to show the road was used by the
general public is analyzed it is evident that the clear and convincing burden of proof was
not met. The Defendants showed that several of the witnesses had permission to be in the
area at one point, and that all of the witnesses had some special interest in the road
staying open.
When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, it is
insufficient to support a determination by clear and convincing evidence that the road was
used continuously for ten years as a public thoroughfare as this Court determined is
required in the Kohler case. The court in Draper, stated the law does not lightly allow the
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transfer of private property to the public. The presumption is on the side of the
landowner, as the court stated in Bertagnole, and the Plaintiff failed to present sufficient
evidence to rebut this presumption and establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the road was dedicated and abandoned to the public. Since Ihe evidence is insufficient to
maintain the required clear and convincing burden of proof, the trial court's ruling that
the road had been dedicated and abandoned to the public is clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants, respectfully request that the judgment
entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court be reversed and that Middle Fork Road be
declared to be a private trail not accessible to the public. In the alternative, if the Court
deems appropriate, the matter be remanded to the trial court for additional evidence as
determined by this Court or the trial court.
DATED this / _ day of August, 2004.

REED M. RICHARDS
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
Randy T. Simonsen
Randy T. Simonsen, LTD.
SIMLEW, L.C.
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Addendum A
Judgment of the Fourth District Court

Gary A. Weston (#3435)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Facsimile: (801)532-1913
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AWINC CORP., an Oklahoma
corporation,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.

RANDY T. SIMONSEN; RANDY T.
SIMONSEN, LTD., a limited partnership;
and SIMLEW L.C., also known as
SIMLEW, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,

Civil No. 000500472
Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendants.

This case was tried to the Court, the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, sitting without a jury, on
January 27, 28 and 29, 2003. Plaintiff, AWINC Corp., was represented by Gary A. Weston of
the firm of Nielsen & Senior. Defendants, Randy T. Simonsen, Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and
Sinlew L.C., were represented by Clifford V. Dunn. On this date, the Court has entered herein its
written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.

The currently existing unimproved mountain road, sometimes known as Middle

Fork Road, and situated northerly of Soldier Summit in Wasatch County, Utah, is a public road
dedicated and abandoned to the public in accordance with Section 72-5-104(1), Utah Code Ann.,
1953, and its predecessor, Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Ann., 1953. Middle Fork Road is more
particularly described as follows:
That currently existing unimproved mountain road, 10 feet in width, commencing
at the intersection of Left Fork Road and what is sometimes known as Middle
Fork Road, in Wasatch County, Utah, and which intersection is in either the
Northeast 1/4 of Section 13, Township 10 South, Range 7 East, or the Northwest
1/4 of Section 18, Township 10 South, Range 8 East, SLB&M, and running
northeasterly, then southeasterly, then southerly, then again southeasterly, and
then again northeasterly across portions of Section 13, Township 10 South, Range
7 East and Sections 18, 17 and 8 of Township 10 South, Rauge 8 East, SLB&M,
to the northerly boundary of the property currently titled to AWINC Corp.
2.

The Defendants Randy T. Simonsen, Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C.

shall forthwith remove or cause to be removed the lock on that certain gate currently placed and
maintained across Middle Fork Road near to the road's intersection with Left Fork Road,
northerly of Soldier Summit in Wasatch County, Utah. Said Defendants shall not place any other
lock or locking device on the gate that prohibits ingress and egress through the gate by members
of the public, including AWINC Corp., and shall permit access through the gate whenever and at
such times as either necessary or convenient to members of the public, including AWINC Corp.
3.

A portion of Middle Fork Road courses across a portion of that certain property

owned by Defendants Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C. and which property is situated
in Wasatch County, Utah, a portion of which is located in the North 1/2 of Section 13, Township
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10 South, Range 7 East, and the North 1/2 of Section 18, Township 10 South, Range 8 East, Salt
Lake Base & Meridian. Defendants, Randy T. Simonsen, Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew
L.C., their grantees, successors, assigns, heirs, agents and invitees be and hereby are perpetually
and permanently enjoined and restrained from maintaining any gate in or across Middle Fork
Road in a closed and locked condition and from obstructing or preventing access by the public,
including AWINC Corp., to the use of Middle Fork Road as it courses on and over said property.
4.

Plaintiffs Second Claim for Relief and Third Claim for Relief of its Amended

Complaint are dismissed, with prejudice.
5.

Plaintiff shall have and recover judgment from Defendants for Plaintiffs costs

incurred in this action.

^

A/\

DATED this / ( J

\l

day of Eetewry, 2003.
' v ' W THE COURT:
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Addendum B
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Gary A. Weston (#3435)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Facsimile: (801)532-1913
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AWINC CORP., an Oklahoma
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RANDY T. SIMONSEN; RANDY T.
SIMONSEN, LTD., a limited partnership;
and SIMLEW L.C., also known as
SIMLEW, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,

)
)
]1 FINDINGS OF FACT
1 AND
]1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
]
;)
;
)

Civil No. 000500472
Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendants.

The above-entitled case was tried to the Court, the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, sitting
without a jury, on January 27, 28 and 29, 2003. Plaintiff, AWINC Corp., was represented by
Gary A. Weston of the firm of Nielsen & Senior. Defendants, Randy T. Simonsen, Randy T.
Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C., were represented by Clifford V. Dunn. The Court heard
testimony of a number of witnesses and received a number of written exhibits. Being fully
advised and pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court makes the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about February 25,1997, Plaintiff received and accepted a certain deed,

Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 3, therein naming Plaintiff as grantee and describing property
consisting of patented mining claims in Wasatch County, Utah ("Plaintiff Property"). A portion
of the Plaintiff Property is located northeasterly of what is commonly known as Soldier Summit
and which is in the Southeast 1/4 of Section 18, part of Section 17, and part of the South 1/2 of
Section 8 in Township 10 South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian.
2.

In September 1995, Defendants, Randy T. Simonsen, Ltd. and Simlew L.C.,

acquired certain land ("Defendant Property"), a portion of which is located in the North 1/2 of
Section 13, Township 10 South, Range 7 East, and the North 1/2 of Section 18, Township 10
South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian.
3.

Both the Plaintiff Property and the Defendant Property lie adjacent to and are

separated by United States Department of Agriculture Forest Sen/ice lands being within the
boundaries of the Uinta National Forest, as shown by year 1975 Uinta National Forest map,
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 5, year 1993 Uinta National Forest Service map, Plaintiffs Trial
Exhibit No. 9, and year 1998 United States Department of the Interior U.S. Geological Survey
map, Plaintiff s Trial Exhibit No. 10.
4.

A portion of the Plaintiff Property lies easterly of the Defendant Property.

Another portion of the Plaintiff Property lies southerly of the Defendant Property.
5.

A road commonly known as Left Fork Road ("Left Fork Road") extends along the

general course of the White River and across a part of the Defendant Property extending from the
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south boundary line of said property northwesterly to and across the west boundary line of the
property.
6.

Both the Plaintiff Property and the Defendant Property are accessed by a certain

unimproved mountain road sometimes called Middle Fork Road ("Middle Fork Road"), the
general course of which is shown in part as a four-wheel drive road on the 1998 U.S. Geological
Survey map, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 10, and which road a trial witness has outlined on said
exhibit with a pink color line. The road is further shown on the 1993 Uinta National Forest
Service map, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 9, in part as four-wheel drive Road 900 and in part as fourwheel drive Road 218. The road is accessed at its far south end by Left Fork Road and at its
north end by a U.S. Forest Service trail sometimes called Crossover Road. Middlq Fork Road
courses across a portion of both the Defendant Property and the Plaintiff Property and is more
particularly described as follows:
That currently existing unimproved mountain road, 10 feet in width, commencing
at the intersection of Left Fork Road and what is sometimes known as Middle
Fork Road, in Wasatch County, Utah, and which intersection is in either the
Northeast 1/4 of Section 13, Township 10 South, Range 7 East, or the Northwest
1/4 of Section 18, Township 10 South, Range 8 East, SLB&M, and running
northeasterly, then southeasterly, then southerly, then again southeasterly, and
then again northeasterly across portions of Section 13, Township 10 South, Range
7 East and Sections 18, 17 and 8 of Township 10 South, Range 8 East, SLB&M,
to the northerly boundary of the Plaintiff Property.
7.

In 1996 or 1997, Defendants erected and placed a metal gate across Middle Fork

Road near to the road's intersection with Left Fork Road and as pictured in Plaintiffs Trial
Exhibit No. 1 ("The Gate"). Continuously since that time, Defendants have maintained The Gate
in a closed and locked condition, thereby prohibiting access through The Gate from and to
Middle Fork Road except with permission of the Defendants.
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8.

In 1997, Defendants caused a fence to be constructed at a distance of

approximately 200 feet on each side of The Gate
9.

Defendants denied Plaintiff access through The Gate except upon the condition

that Plaintiff relinquish any right to such access
10

In 1997, a fence wire drop gate ("Livestock Gate") was constructed by Mr Don

Blanchard, at the direction of the Defendants, across Middle Fork Road at the approximate
location where the road crosses the easterly-most boundary of the Defendant Property
11

Commencing sometime in the time frame of the 1960s and continuing to the time

of the September 1995 acquisition of the Defendant Property by Randy T Simonsen, Ltd and
Simlew L C , the Defendant Property or portions thereof were leased for sheep grazing purposes.
One or more of those lessees had placed along Left Fork Road rocks and tires on which had been
painted words declaring "No Trespass " Such were also placed in the general area where Middle
Fork Road accessed Left Fork Road and upon Middle Fork Road in that general area, but did not
prevent or halt public use of Middle Fork Road
12

Beginning in 1995 and continuing to the time of trial, Defendants posted the

Defendant Property with signs declaring "No Trespass" and prohibited use of that portion of
Middle Fork Road coursing across the Defendant Property, except with permission of the
Defendants
13

Beginning in 1997 and continuing to the time of trial, the Plaintiff posted the

Plaintiff Property with signs declaring "No Trespass " Plaintiff did not restrict use of Middle
Fork Road as it crosses over the Plaintiff Property, but rather prohibited use of the adjacent
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Plaintiff Property except by permission, which permission was from time to time given to various
persons requesting permission to hunt wild game on the property.
14.

Cullen Goodwin, David Ellis, Fred Addis and Kenneth Earl, along with members

of their respective families, drove motor vehicles along the entire length of Middle Fork Road
while hunting, camping, wildlife viewing and sightseeing in the Soldier Summit mountain area.
Cullen Goodwin and Fred Addis, with family members, so used the entire length of the road in
1965 and each year thereafter until The Gate was erected. They used the road on numerous
separate times each year beginning in the spring of the year and ending in October or November
of each year. David Ellis began his use of the road with members of his family in 1977 or 1978
and, until the placement of The Gate, drove motor vehicles along the entire length of the road on
a number of separate occasions during the spring, summer and fall months of each year for
sightseeing, camping and hunting. Kenneth Earl, with members of his family, began driving
motor vehicles along the full length of the road in the 1970s. He made such use of the road four
or five times each year thereafter until The Gate was placed. His first use was typically on the
July 4th weekend and his last in October of each year.
15.

Cullen Goodwin, David Ellis, Fred Addis and Kenneth Earl were members of the

general public. They so used Middle Fork Road without ever asking permission or having been
given permission for its use. They did not own property in the vicinity of Middle Fork Road nor
in the Soldier Summit mountain area. While operating motor vehicles on the road, it was
common for them to encounter other people not part of their particular group or party and who
were operating motor vehicles along the road. Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Addis and Mr. Earl
were never requested not to use the road nor were told that they could not use the road. They
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operated pickup trucks in earlier years and, in later years, four-wheel ATV motor vehicles along
the entire length of the road. None of them at anytime had seen a gate across Middle Fork Road
prior to the erection of The Gate and the Livestock Gate.
16.

Immediately prior to the placement of The Gate and of the Livestock Gate, Middle

Fork Road was both accessible and usable by motor vehicles. At two or three locations on the
Plaintiff Property, towards the north end of the property, there was a steep grade in the road that
made it difficult if not impossible for a two-wheel drive motor vehicle to drive northerly on those
particular parts of the road. Those locations were accessible to use by four-wheel drive motor
vehicles. All portions of the road were usable by both two-wheel drive and four-wheel drive
vehicles moving down the road in a southerly direction.
17.

In the early 1990s, the United States Forest Service placed wood posts in Middle

Fork Road at or northerly of the north boundary of the Plaintiff Property to restrict use to only
motor trail bikes or four-wheel ATV motor vehicles on that portion of the road on Forest Service
property and north of the Plaintiff Property.
18.

Defendants' purpose in maintaining The Gate in a closed and locked condition is

to prevent use by the general public, including Plaintiff, of that portion of Middle Fork Road as
described in Finding of Fact No. 6, which courses upon and across the Defendant Property.
19.

The Gate and the Livestock Gate prevented public use of that portion of Middle

Fork Road as described in Finding of Fact No. 6 which courses on and over the Defendant
Property. The gates prevented use of that part of the road by Plaintiff.
20.

Defendants continue to maintain The Gate in a locked condition and to refuse

members of the general public and Plaintiff access through The Gate.
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21.

Members of the general public driving motor vehicles on Middle Fork Road did

so openly and notoriously and the then owners of the Plaintiff Property and of the Defendant
Property knew or should have known of said open and notorious use.
22.

Prior to the installation of The Gate, the general public had free and unlimited

access and the ability to drive motor vehicles along the entire length of Middle Fork Road as
limited by weather conditions.
23.

Persons using Middle Fork Road were not doing so pursuant to permission

requested or obtained from owners of the Defendant Property or the Plaintiff Property.
24.

The general public has made use of Middle Fork Road as a public thoroughfare

prior to the erection and placement of The Gate for a period of more than ten consecutive years.
Said use was continuous during said period of time in that the public used the road whenever
they found it necessary or convenient and use was limited only by prevailing weather conditions.
25.

Prior to placement of The Gate across Middle Fork Road, there was no motor

vehicle use of any portion of Middle Fork Road, conditioned on permission granted. One Boyd
Marsing did grant permission to some wild game hunters, but such use did not pertain to the
Defendant Property or that portion of Middle Fork Road coursing across the Defendant Property.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff is an Oklahoma corporation qualified to do business in the State of Utah.

2.

Plaintiff is and has been the owner of the Plaintiff Property continuously since

February 1997.
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3.

Plaintiff is the party responsible to prove that Middle Fork Road has been

dedicated as a public thoroughfare. The showing must be by clear and convincing evidence.
4.

Prior to the placement of The Gate and of the Livestock Gate, Middle Fork Road

had been used by the general public for a period of some 20 or more consecutive years for motor
vehicle travel over its entire length and whenever members of the public found it necessary or
convenient.
5.

Middle Fork Road is a public road dedicated and abandoned to the public in

accordance with Section 72-5-104(1), Utah Code Ann., 1953, and its predecessor, Section 27-1289, Utah Code Ann., 1953.
6.

Plaintiff has no claim against Defendants for a non-exclusive prescriptive

easement as prayed under the Second Claim for Relief of its Amended Complaint, which claim is
dismissed with prejudice.
7.

Plaintiff, having provided no evidence of damages for trespass, has no claim

against Defendants under the Third Claim for Relief of its Amended Complaint, which claim is
dismissed with prejudice.
8.

Judgment should be entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants

declaring, ordering and adjudging as follows:
(a)

Middle Fork Road, as described in Finding of Fact No. 6, is a public road

dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public.
(b)

The Defendants shall forthwith remove or cause to be removed the lock

from The Gate and no longer place any lock or device on The Gate that prohibits ingress
and egress through The Gate by members of the public, including Plaintiff. Defendants
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shall permit access through The Gate whenever and at such times as either necessary or
convenient to members of the public, including Plaintiff.
(c)

A permanent injunction be issued enjoining Defendants, their grantees,

successors, assigns, heirs, agents and invitees from maintaining The Gate or any other
gate in or across Middle Fork Road, as described in Finding of Fact No. 6, in a closed and
locked condition and from obstructing or preventing access by the public, including
Plaintiff, to the use of Middle Fork Road as it courses on and over the Defendant
Property.
(d)
DATED this

ForPlaintiff s costs herein incurred.
/0

day of March, 2003.
BM THE COURT

DON\LBrr-BYfeE
DISTRICT COURT JUD
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